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백범 김구과 여순사건, 미군문서







제 3 부 문서자료 / 877 -



54 Allan Haden, Leon Prou’s Impression of Korean Conditions (1948. 10. 26) 

<NARA, RG84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 

U. S. Political Advisor for Japan- Tokyo, Box No. 34)

(중략)

SUBJECT:    Impressions of Korean Conditions



Partincipants :  Leon prou, Bureau Chief of agence France Presse

Allen Iladen, Inforirmation officer

Prou has just returned from a stay in Korea where he went on account of the Yosu revolt.

Prou says that the operational features of the

revolt are obvious; the rebels will be controlled sooner

of later. 

But his description of the background and some

of the collateral features are interesting.



He says that the Seoul police consider the plot to

have been not Communist originally, but inspired by --and

they name him  Kim  Koo the rightist leader who opposes

Synghman Rhee; that the home minister and the Foreign

minister both said to hiia they considered the revolt as

"Coinmunist with some rightist elements, though they did

not name Kim Koo.



Prou explains the situation this way:



There are two law enforcement bodies in Korea: (1) the

police trained by the Japanese and loyal to the governnient

of Rhee; (2) the National Army, which earlier was supposed

to be a constabulary.



Broadly speaking, Prou considers that the soldiers

of the Korean army are general recruits, some 2/3 of which

have had some training. When the Students Array was dis-

solved at the end of the war with Japan, Wany of these

joined the National Army. No screening  was made of

applicants and many were far Left in their views. Thus

they respond to Soviet inspiration combined with Korean

nationalism.





- 878 / 제 9 권 건국 - 통일운동 (영문자료)



Broadly sreaking, Prou believes the officers to

have had traing in China, and to respond largely to

Chinese views, to nini Koo, and to the milder rightist

leader, kim Ku Sic, and though not ail commie, to be

anti-U.S or anti-Rhee because of his U.S. protection.



He considers significant that these two men went

to Pyongyang before the recent elections in South Korea

and on their return opposed the elections pn the grounds

of wanting a united Korea before orecnization of the

govermaent.



Prou also considers that the revolt at Yosu was

engineered by Kim Koo (on the police’s say-so) as a

"test" of Rhee. The test was to find out (1) Rhee’s

ability to face a crisis; (2) the usefulness of the

forces he can mobilize, and (3) the attitude of the U.S.



Prou feels that the recent revolt has done the

following: (1) shown that Rhee does not have control of

the army but only of the police; (2) the departure of the

U.S. army was delayed indefinitely since on our departure

Rhee would face not only the Northern Korean Conuaunists

but also nationalist opposition which stops at nothing

within his own country; (3) and has seriously jeopardized

chances of recognition of Rhee * s government, by the United

Nations.



Kim Koo said when Prou went tio see him"This inci-dent 

will not ohange the views of the United States, or of

Russia. But it may well change the attitude of the

neutrals in the United Nations."AccordinR to Prou, this

shows that Kim Koo has not abandoned his idea of a united

Korea before the governments organization, and that ho

prefers for the United Nations not to recognize the

legolity of Rhee's government.



When Prou told Kim Koo that there were reports that

"certain Rightist elementg" had participated in the Yosu

affair, Kim Koo smiled, and replied "I have no dictionary

available which contains a satisfactory definition of the

word 'rightist' ." Prou points out this is no denial.



Prou emphasized that the army officers as nationalist

Koreans are broadly speaking contemptuous of Rhee as an

American puppett but that this does not mean by any means

that they are necessarily Communist.



He also said thot he was surprised at the violence

of criticism In the rightist papers (and aiost are

rishtist in South Korea) of the provisional financial

agreement signed between Korea and the United States. He



제 3 부 문서자료 / 879



say that many newspapers considered that the clauses

giving the U.S special privileges in some areas was a

duplicate of the Japanese protectorate treaty of 1905.



He described the mutiny of the Yosu brigade as

having occurred just as they were to embark for Cheju do.

an island on which there has been semi-bermanent armed

opposition to the government. Ke described conditions

on the island as "a permanent "Daquis".



Prou ffels that immediately on the departure of the

U.S Army influential Korean officers will force a

friendly settlement with Russia. He describes them as

feeting that in the event of U.S.-Russian conflict, it

would be they who would bear the brunt of the trouble;

and bence the arrangement is necessary since Russia is

close and, the U.S  far away.



He desoribed the ubiquity of policemen and soldiers

guarding everything, and recounted the syllogism whereby

Korea is not a Police state: Korea has many policemen.

Thfy are democratically minded. Ergo: Korea is not a

police state.



EVALUATION OF LEON PROU:



”Prou is a typical European social-democrat

Intellectual. Left of center, about as far as we have

become accustomed to think of New Deal Braintrusters.



He would pyobably vote the Socialist ticket in France.

Very definitely not Communist; equally definitely not

Rightist I met Prou at the house of one of the French

Pisslon,and hsve seen him a couple of times since. He

seems to have a wide aoquaintance in Japan since. 

He occupation circles and speaks English well.

Allen Haden

백범 김구 전집 제9권

제3부 문서자료 879페이지

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